If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning. Our goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. 2004) (stating that de novo standard of review applies to construction of statutes and contracts). 2010) (observing that district court s interpretation of a stipulation and judgment is reviewed de novo) Rosenberg v. § 317A.521) and the parties stipulation of dismissal and order for judgment, each of which presents a question of law, which we review de novo. DECISION The issues raised by Wicker require interpretation of the MNCA (specifically Minn. Wicker appealed and moved for an award of attorney fees on appeal. The district court concluded that Wicker s attempt to satisfy his burden solely by reference to alleged inconsistencies in Mortimore s deposition testimony and his own general denials was insufficient. 2(a), which requires a claimant to establish that the complained-of conduct was in good faith and that the claimant reasonably believed the conduct was in the best interests of the corporation. The district court also denied the request on the ground that Wicker failed to meet the applicable mandatory criteria for indemnification under Minn. The district court reasoned that the postjudgment request for indemnification was an indirect claim under the unambiguous terms of the stipulation for dismissal and, as such, it was expressly barred.
Wicker can assert his indemnification request. The district court denied the motion on the ground that his case is completed, and there is no pending proceeding in which Mr. On June 8, 2010, Wicker moved the district court for indemnification from R.S. The district court entered judgment of dismissal based on the stipulation on April 16, 2010. Eden by letter of his client s intent to claim indemnification under the provisions of the MNCA for reasonable expenses incurred in the Mortimore 2 litigation. On April 5, 2010, the same day he signed the stipulation for dismissal, Wicker s counsel notified R.S. with prejudice on the merits and without costs and disbursements to any party. All three parties subsequently signed a stipulation for dismissal of the action and all its claims, including all direct and indirect claims, made or to be made. On March 23, 2010, following mediation, Mortimore signed a release of all claims against R.S. Eden and Wicker filed separate answers, each denying all claims. Eden s Sentence to Service program in August 2007 under Wicker s supervision. Eden, a chapter 317A nonprofit corporation, alleging that Wicker had committed sexual assault and battery against Mortimore while she was participating in R.S.
FACTS In July 2009, Tammy Mortimore commenced a lawsuit against appellant Ojay Wicker and his former employer, respondent R.S. We affirm the district court and deny appellant s motion for attorney fees.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by determining that (1) the terms of a stipulation for dismissal entered among the parties barred appellant s postjudgment claim for indemnification, and (2) appellant failed to demonstrate the mandatory criteria for indemnification under the MNCA. Eden, pursuant to the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporation Act (MNCA), Minn. UNPUBLISHED OPINION WRIGHT, Judge Appellant challenges the district court s denial of his request for indemnification from respondent R.S. Shoemaker, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Wright, Presiding Judge Kalitowski, Judge and Larkin, Judge. Woodrow, Waldeck & Lind, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent R.S. Filed AugAffirmed motion denied Wright, Judge Ramsey County District Court File No. STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A10-1877 Tammy Mortimore, Plaintiff, vs. This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn.
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